Can an employer legally conduct a poll of its employees to gauge union support without first demonstrating a good faith doubt about the union's majority status?

Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. acquired a Mack Trucks factory branch in Allentown, Pennsylvania, and rehired 32 of the 45 former employees. The union that had represented the employees for 17 years requested continued recognition, but Allentown refused, citing a good faith doubt about the union's majority support. Allentown conducted an employee poll, which the union lost 19 to 13.

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). An Administrative Law Judge determined that Allentown was a 'successor' employer to Mack Trucks, inheriting the bargaining obligation and presumption of continuing union support. The judge ruled that Allentown's poll violated the National Labor Relations Act, as Allentown lacked an 'objective reasonable doubt' about the union's majority status.

Allentown was charged with violating the National Labor Relations Act. An Administrative Law Judge found that Allentown had indeed violated the Act. The National Labor Relations Board subsequently adopted the ALJ's findings and issued an order requiring Allentown to recognize and bargain with the union. Allentown appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which enforced the Board's bargaining order. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Allentown sought further review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.

(Scalia, J.)

No. An employer cannot legally conduct a poll of its employees to gauge union support without first demonstrating a good faith doubt about the union's majority status. The "reasonable doubt" test for employer polls is facially rational and consistent with the National Labor Relations Act. This standard reflects the conclusion that polling should only be tolerated when the employer might otherwise simply withdraw recognition and refuse to bargain. The requirement of a good faith doubt serves as a safeguard against unnecessary interference with established bargaining relationships. Employers must have objective, reliable evidence that reasonably indicates a loss of union support before conducting a poll. This evidence may include employee statements, union inactivity, or high turnover rates, but mere suspicion or subjective belief is insufficient. The standard balances the employer's need to ascertain union status with the employees' right to be free from unwarranted polling that could undermine their collective bargaining rights. Applying this test requires a fact-specific analysis of the evidence available to the employer at the time of the poll. Circumstantial evidence can be considered, but it must be evaluated in its totality to determine if it reasonably supports a good faith doubt of majority status. The threshold for demonstrating such doubt is substantial, reflecting the importance of stable labor relations and the presumption of continued majority support for incumbent unions. This interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act promotes industrial peace by preventing employers from unnecessarily destabilizing established bargaining relationships through speculative polling.

Concurrence/Dissent (Rehnquist, C.J.) The Board's standard for polling is irrational and inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act. The treatment of polling raises First Amendment concerns and lacks support in the Act itself. While I agree with Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion, the Board's approach to polling cannot be considered rational under the Act's framework.

Concurrence/Dissent (Breyer, J.) The Court has improperly departed from the established legal standard for substantial evidence review. By rewriting a Board rule without adequate justification, we fail to give proper deference to the Board's factfinding authority. This approach undermines the longstanding principles of administrative law and judicial review. While I concur with Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, I must dissent from Parts III and IV due to these significant concerns about the Court's reasoning and its implications for future cases involving agency decisions.